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A New Conception of War: John Boyd, the U.S.
Marines, and Maneuver Warfare, by Ian T.
Brown. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Univ.
Press, 2018. 311 pages. Available for download at
usmcu.edu/. Free.

There is more folklore associated with
John Boyd than perhaps any other
military thinker of the last fifty years.
Maverick fighter pilot, iconoclast,
conceiver of the now-ubiquitous “OODA
loop,” Boyd never fit neatly in anyone’s
mold. Knife fighting his way through the
Pentagon bureaucracy, Boyd reshaped
a generation of U.S. fighter aircraft,
influenced key acquisition programs,
and changed the way American military
officers thought about combat—amassing along the way a distinguished
list of senior enemies. His influence,
while profound, usually was indirect
and always difficult to characterize.
It is ironic that Boyd had his most
sweeping impact outside both aviation
and the Air Force that he served for thirty
years. Maneuver warfare—the defining
characteristic of Marine Corps combat
doctrine for three decades—was in no
small part a product of Boyd’s thought.
While Boyd has been the subject of
several books, in A New Conception of
War Marine major Ian Brown provides
the first complete account of Boyd and
the Marine Corps. In the process, he
crafts a case study in military institutional
change that deserves wide attention.
Brown asserts that the road from Boyd’s
ideas to maneuver warfare doctrine
required four essential and distinct
elements: need, idea, internal advocacy,
and leadership. First, the Marine Corps
of the 1970s and ’80s recognized that it
needed a new institutional approach. The
end of the Vietnam War left the Corps
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struggling to find its way in a world
newly refocused on great-power competition with the Soviet Union. Advances
in military technology had rendered
familiar Marine Corps operational
approaches questionable. Not interested in being relegated to constabulary
operations outside the main fight, the
Corps was looking for a way to leverage
what it believed were its distinctive
strengths in support of high-end combat.
The second essential element was Boyd
and his ideas. Brown, like all writers who
have sought to capture the essence of
Boyd’s thinking, struggles to capture the
shifting intellectual journey that marked
Boyd’s life. Boyd’s seminal work was a
briefing entitled “Patterns of Conflict.”
Delivered over the course of hours, each
presentation expressed Boyd’s thinking at
that moment. By never putting his ideas
fully into print, Boyd could (and routinely
did) deflect criticism by remaining the
sole arbiter of his meaning. Nonetheless,
Brown manages to capture the sweep of
Boyd’s ideas. Readers familiar with the
common simplistic summary of Boyd’s
observation, orientation, decision, and
action (OODA) loop model will be
intrigued by the full scope of this idea
and how Boyd extended its implications
to the breadth of human conflict.
However profound, Boyd’s ideas would
not have had influence without advocacy
within the Marine Corps. Brown excels in
describing the small group of influencers
who became the key internal advocates
for Boyd. Each occupied a sweet spot in
the Corps hierarchy: senior enough to be
credible, but not so senior that he could
not critique the service; experienced
enough to see the need for change;
knowledgeable and confident in his own
thinking; and positioned at an overlap
between the Corps and sources of outside
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ideas. One key influencer, Colonel
Michael Wyly, came to occupy key positions in the Marine Corps educational
establishment, where Boyd’s ideas crystallized into maneuver warfare doctrine.
The Corps’s internal advocates eventually
found senior leadership willing to push
the service in a new direction, most
importantly General Al Gray. In 1989,
Commandant Gray issued Fleet Marine
Force Manual 1. Entitled simply Warfighting, FMFM-1 made maneuver warfare the
key defining characteristic of the Corps’s
operational approach; it has remained
so for thirty years. It is significant to
note, however, that the senior leaders
who adopted maneuver warfare did
not become converts as senior officers;
rather, they had become interested in
these ideas years before, ascended the
ranks, then moved to implement their
vision—an observation consistent with
other studies of institutional reform.
The story of how a rogue Air Force
fighter pilot shaped the core ideas of
the Marine Corps is a case study in how
militaries learn and change. Many similar
case studies oversimplify this messy and
imperfect process, creating a clean narrative of progressive heroes and resistant
villains. Brown avoids this trap—a success
all the more impressive given the strong
opinions that still surround Boyd. In so
doing, Brown has produced a book that
will take its place alongside Rosen’s Winning the Next War and Bergerson’s The
Army Gets an Air Force as a foundational
study of military institutional change.
A New Conception of War skillfully brings
an extraordinary, historic episode to a
new generation of Marine Corps leaders
and, in a larger context, to any leader
who is contemplating leading change.
DALE C. RIELAGE
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The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and
Civil-Military Relations, by Christopher J. Lamb.
Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018.
330 pages. Available for download at jcs.mil/.
Free.

Khmer Rouge forces boarded and took
control of the U.S.-registered merchant
vessel Mayaguez on 12 May 1975,
then released the crew three days later.
Coming just two weeks after the fall of
Saigon, the move was considered a brazen challenge to the U.S. commitment
in the region. Ultimately the American
response resulted in the release of
the crew and their ship, at the cost of
forty-one American servicemen killed
and dozens wounded. Christopher J.
Lamb, a distinguished research fellow at
National Defense University, has written
a thorough and evenhanded history of
the crisis, demonstrating a command of
existing literature and original sources.
In the immediate wake of the invasion
and collapse of South Vietnam, the
overwhelming motivation among
decision makers was to demonstrate
American resolve. President Ford and
Henry Kissinger—the latter wearing
both the national security advisor (NSA)
and Secretary of State hats—were fully
in charge, but Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger, Deputy NSA Brent
Scowcroft, White House chief of staff
Donald Rumsfeld, and other key actors
all agreed with Ford and Kissinger that
forceful action was necessary to reassure
allies, to show Beijing that Washington
would remain engaged in the region,
and above all to deter Pyongyang. North
Korean aggression was a real concern,
as was a repeat of the 1968 Pueblo
incident or the lesser-known EC-121
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